Dutch Devolution

(Also posted at http://www.criticaltwenties.in/sport/the-dutch-devolution)

There is something utterly alluring about the Dutch and its football that has attracted me to it over the years. Maybe, it has to do with the fact that my initiation to the game coincided with the flowering of a ridiculously talented group of players trained at the Ajax academy (the class of Bergkamp, Kluivert, Seedorf, Davids and the De Boer twins). Or maybe, it’s the mythical resonance of ‘total football’ that had enraptured watchers of its time, leaving behind an indelible mark on the game. Or maybe, the reasons are more superficial; I vaguely remember answering, ‘orange’, when asked as a kid what my favourite colour was.

Being so, the World Cup final between the Netherlands and Spain left me with a strong sense of disappointment, not so much a result of the outcome (Spain was unquestionably a worthy winner) but the roguish style that was employed by the Dutch. In adopting a tactic that was designed to thuggishly intimidate and destroy Spain’s football, the Dutch not only betrayed the stupendous talent at its disposal, but also desecrated some of the celebrated grandiose of its former teams.

The Dutch game over the years has been characterised by its unique perception of space and resultantly an ability to construct moves of artistic splendour. The beauty of its football has been a product of creative thinking and an ability to do things differently, as opposed to an adherence to the predominant tactics of the times.

In his book, ‘The Brilliant Orange’, David Winner draws intriguing links between Dutch architecture and art and its football and in doing so, conceptualises the role played by the understanding of ‘space’ in its football. He argues, that to understand the idea of Dutch football, it is necessary to look beyond the game as played on the pitch and to analyse the ethos of the Dutch people and its approach to other streams of life. Dutch space, he evocatively asserts is different. He says ‘other nations and football culture may have produced greater goal-scorers, more dazzling individual ball artists and more dependable and efficient tournament winning teams. But no one has ever imagined or structured their play as abstractly, as architecturally, in such a measured fashion as the Dutch.’

Of course, the Dutch game took its time to reach a level of tactical sophistication. In fact, professionalism in football wasn’t prevalent in the Netherlands until the mid nineteen-fifties, a time at which it was one of the most backward states in Europe. But flanking a socio-cultural rebellion that has seen the Netherlands become one of the most progressive nations in the world was a revolution on the pitch that ultimately placed its football on the highest of plinths.

Ajax, first under the coaching of Rinus Michels and then under Stefan Kovacs, completed a unique feat of winning the European Cup in three consecutive seasons from 1971-1973, by playing a system that is now renowned as ‘total football’. The style involved astonishing fluidity of movement with players rapidly interchanging their positions; defenders turning into attackers, central midfielders moving into full-back and so on. That they performed their tasks to perfection was no doubt an upshot of having played together for years, but at the heart of their artistry laid an innate understanding of space.

Michels, moved on to coach Barcelona, joined soon by Johan Cruyff, and established the foundation for a bright future, which has culminated in the club’s and Spain’s recent success. But I must add that although Spain’s and Barcelona’s style is built on the bedrock of fluidity in movement, it is vastly different from the methods employed by Ajax and the Netherlands in the late nineteen-sixties, and nineteen-seventies.

Sjaak Swart who won eight league championships with Ajax states in Winner’s book that position-switching developed naturally and that for all the artistry, its football was direct. “In four passes we would be in front of goal. Nowadays they take twenty passes – backwards, sideways, backwards. We didn’t play like that. We went for the goal. We could play sixty minutes of pressing… I’ve never seen any other club anywhere who could do that.”

Spain’s football on the other hand is built on an ability to maintain possession of the ball and thereby wearing the opponents to submission. I say this to merely remove any misconception that Spain’s football is akin to that of the great Dutch teams of the years gone by and not to demean its football, which has been wondrous in its own way.

The Dutch on the other hand, as I said have always had an ability to think innovatively, especially about space which can so often be the decisive factor in football games. At the core of the analysis on the Dutch game of the past lies a premise that its football has an orientation garnered towards creation and not destruction. Against Spain however, the team seemed more intent on spoiling rather than inventing, a tactic that ran entirely counter to the cultural pedigree of its football.

It is no doubt unrealistic to expect a team to adhere to a system that was gloriously, if not entirely successfully, employed three-four decades ago as Rafael Honigstein points out. Tactics have evolved over a course of time and a side can ill-afford to compromise on defensive responsibilities for the sake of pure attacking beauty. Theoretically, Honigstein’s stance is sound, but the suggestion that this Dutch team was no more defensive than its predecessors is fallacious. Yes, the article was written before the final, at a time when the Dutch style hadn’t regressed as much as it had by the time they played Spain, but to imply that its football failed to thrill because the opposition was defensive is wholly off beam.

Perhaps in the years gone by, teams were tactically more naïve and weren’t astute enough to counter the attacking brilliance of the Dutch. But it wasn’t quite as easy as it’s sometimes made to seem. The beauty of the Dutch was not merely a consequence of the opposition allowing it space to operate, but on the contrary was founded on its own ability to manufacture and construct space.

In addition to Honigstein’s view, it must also be said that that total-football, as is understood in some circles, was not an entirely attacking strategy. The system was about controlling space; compressing it when without the ball and expanding it when in possession of the ball. Consequently, it worked wonderfully from a holistically strategic standpoint and not purely from an attacking perspective. The swift interchanging of positions by the players and a multifarious approach to the game was never a compromise on defensive duties, so to understand the tactic as simply an offensive ploy is erroneous.

My intention is not to deny the necessity for pragmatism. In a brief piece that I had earlier, I had argued that good football and beautiful football do not necessarily correlate and I am not loath to adding that the former is mostly a product of ‘pragmatism’, a word which, especially in footballing parlance, is grossly misunderstood. To be pragmatic is to be practical and regardless of its lack of aesthetic appeal, I believe, the tactics employed by the Dutch in the final were predominantly unworkable. No doubt, its decision to tackle with vigour helped stifle Spain for large parts of the game, but eventually it was bound to cost it dear.

It would have certainly been imprudent for the Dutch to attack unbothered by Spain’s reputation, but greater thoughtfulness was required to counter the opposition than merely following a herd of teams that have tried defying such a brand of football with vicious tackling. In recent times, any analysis concerning Barcelona or Spain sees a reference to Internazionale’s victory over the Catalan club in the Champions League semi-final. It must, though, be borne in mind that the second leg performance of the Italians, hailed as one of the greatest defensive performances of recent times, saw it play for the majority of the game with ten men. Undoubtedly following the sending off, Inter maintained shape immaculately and defended with aplomb, but it is important to note that this was achieved without resorting to excessively robust or brutal means.

One may also point to the fact that Spain’s goal came late in extra-time and that the fact that if not for its profligacy in front of goal, the Dutch may well have emerged successful. However, it’s significant to note that with a different referee, it may well have been a man-down minutes into the game. Some argue that the Dutch were entitled in endeavouring to win ugly, considering the failures of the past, which off-set some of its brilliant artistry. But to see the Dutch reduced to measures that are the norm for lesser teams was both impractical and a perfidy of its magnificent footballing history. With no sign of Bert van Marvijk, the present coach of the Netherlands, being replaced, it’s difficult to imagine a radical amendment in the existing system, which is not only tragic but also grossly obtuse.

Germany's victory exemplifies the relevance of Sacchi's methods

I have had a lot of time to dwell over Germany’s emphatic victory against Argentina and yet my amazement at the beauty of their defensive showing fails to cease. Of course they notched up four goals for the third time in the tournament and were highly enterprising going forward, but all of that was built on the bedrock of a marvellous defensive performance.

In adopting a method of zonal-marking in its most conventional form, not only did Germany’s organisation prove hugely effective, it also served as wonderful vindication of the timelessness of Ariggo Sacchi’s tactical advancements.

In the epilogue to his comprehensive and insightful book on the evolution of football tactics, Jonathan Wilson quotes Sacchi as worrying about the lack of a significant tactical development since the ones that he had masterminded during his time at AC Milan in the 1980s. The correctness of the analysis may be debatable, especially considering the increasing importance of players that look to operate between the bands of midfield and defence as previously understood, but the relevance of Sacchi's tactical thinking to modern day football is unquestionable.

Although several teams had trialled a system incorporating an element of zonal marking, the tactic found its perfect synthesis for the first time through the organisational skills of Sacchi at AC Milan. Luis Vincio at Napoli in the mid 1970s and Nils Liedholm at Roma in the early to mid 1980s had tested a system involving zonal marking, albeit with varying degrees of success, but up until the time when Sacchi took over at Milan, man to man marking with a customary libero/sweeper in place had been the preferred mode of defending for all Italian teams.

Appointed in 1986, soon after Silvio Berlusconi had acquired control of Milan, Sacchi undoubtedly had a wealth of resources at his disposal, including players of the calibre of Ruud Gullit, Marco van Basten, Roberto Donadoni, Franco Baresi and Paolo Maldini, so much so that some sceptics believe that the team would have been successful regardless of the adopted tactics. But largely, Sacchi has been accorded universal credit for remodelling a tactical system that had embodied the ethos of Italian football culture and in the process not only setting Milan towards a path of extraordinary success, but also laying out a plan that has remained at the forefront of football till date.

Sacchi’s system essentially entailed pressing in zones and concentrating on marking space as opposed to marking in relation to the position of individual players. In many ways the structure was comparable to the ones adopted earlier by Rinus Michels at Ajax and Barcelona and by Valery Lobanovskyi at Dynamo Kyiv, but the development of the tactic in its most systemised manner was indisputably pioneered by the Italian.

In marking zones there is never an established defensive pattern. Attackers with or without the ball are passed from zone to zone and from player to player and resultantly the team without the ball is in a position to compress the space available to the attacking team.

Practically, zonal marking isn’t as simplistic as it sounds. As Alessandro Zauli emphasises in his book on Modern Tactics, it is necessary that no more than a short distance be maintained between the player who moves to mark the opponent in possession of the ball and the players in the zones closest to the area of possession. Also of primary importance is the cover that needs to be provided by the defender diagonally behind the first defender, in the event that the attacker manages to free himself from the defender in his zone. All of this requires tremendous focus and discipline, as was personified beautifully by the Germans on Saturday.

Teams generally have a tendency to assign a specific player/s to mark Lionel Messi, if not throughout the length and breadth of the entire pitch, at least in specific zones, as Mexico had done in the round of 16 where Rafael Marquez was handed the unenviable task. But Germany chose to treat Messi on par with the other Argentineans and passed him from zone to zone and from player to player. Every time Messi moved to a different zone by beating his direct marker, he was confronted by a marker in the new zone and as a result, he failed to find space regardless of how deep or how central he had drifted.

Germany also ensured that they made the pitch as narrow as possible when Argentina had the ball, thereby managing to compress space, making it more and more difficult for the South Americans to break through the bands of four that had been installed both in defence and in midfield.

It’s quite conceivable that had Argentina possessed a more penetrative passer in the middle of midfield, breaking past the German bands may have been more achievable, but as it stood, every time Germany won the ball back, either Lukas Podolski on the left wing or one of Thomas Mueller or Phillip Lahm on the other flank, made themselves available in as wide a position as possible, enabling their team to stretch the play both quickly and incisively. Consequently, not only were Germany able to maintain their organisation at the back, but were also able to forcefully attack Argentina every time an opportunity presented itself.

Germany’s disciplined adherence to shape meant that the terrifically talented Argentine front-line was rendered virtually futile, but it must be said that Spain, who they face in the semi-finals, are likely to offer a test of different class. Considering that Spain like Argentina are lacking in width, with both David Villa and Andres Iniesta tending to glide inwards, it should be predominantly unproblematic for Germany to narrow the field of play when Spain are in possession of the ball. But the fluidity and the interchanging of the Spanish forwards together with the ingenuity entrenched in their midfield make it paramount that Germany remains at their organised best, which should ensure a thoroughly fascinating contest.

Time for FIFA to embrace technology

It’s hard to imagine that the result of Germany’s and England’s round of 16 encounter would have been any different had Frank Lampard’s effort on goal been allowed to stand, as it rightfully should have been. But it certainly served as further vindication of why FIFA must embrace goal-line technology.

In spite of vehement opposition from several quarters, led by its President Sepp Blatter, FIFA has been dogged in its resistance towards the use of technology. Its basis for the rejection of technology has primarily been two fold. At the first level, Blatter argues that the rules need to be applied uniformly across the globe and since many matches, even at the highest level aren’t televised, it’s impossible to achieve the desired consistency. Secondly, Blatter contends that the introduction of technology to determine whether the ball has crossed the goal-line will lead to an inevitable clamour for technology to be used to resolve disputable calls in other areas of the game and as ultimately the decision needs to be made by a human mind, this may prove a self-defeating exercise.

The arguments, it must be said, are entirely fallacious. FIFA is without question affluent enough to provide the required technology to bodies around the world so as to ensure that any rules involving the use of technology are universally applied, a point that is accentuated by the fact that FIFA is set to generate a whopping $ 3.2 billion in revenue from the current World Cup cycle. Paul Hawkins, the Managing Director of Hawk-Eye, explains in an article in today’s Times that the issue of Hawk-Eye being too expensive does not arise as the experience of using the said technology in tennis shows. In tennis, the authorities make money by selling the sponsorship of Hawk-Eye for an amount in excess of what Hawk-Eye is paid to provide the service and therefore any financial concerns for applying the technology are comprehensively countered.

As far as the accuracy of Hawk-Eye is concerned, I must admit that I have my reservations, particularly in its application to LBW decisions in cricket. But the calculations required in determining whether a football has crossed the goal-line are far more straightforward and is therefore bound to be predominantly precise. Hawk-Eye is said to have been tested both by the Barclays Premier League and the International Football Association Board and has apparently proved accurate in all instances of testing. Further, as added by Hawkins, “goal-line decisions are the only decisions which are entirely definitive and the answer can be provided to the referee within 0.5 seconds of the incident happening”, which means that any concerns that the game will be slowed by the use of the technology are wholly offset.

There will undoubtedly be a call for introduction of technology at various levels of the game, as proved by the further embarrassment caused to FIFA when a blatantly offside Carlos Tevez opened the scoring in Argentina’s victory against Mexico. But the fact that technology can never definitively rule on such decisions, means that the introduction of goal-line technology is unlikely to open a Pandora’s Box, as feared by FIFA.

It is understood that as a consequence of the decision to disallow Lampard’s goal, two additional assistant referees, one behind each of the goals, as was seen in last season’s Europa League games, are likely to be introduced. Although it lacked a definitive moment, UEFA’s experiment last season proved laregly successful and it is fair to believe that the presence of such an official would have ensured that the correct decision would have been made yesterday. However, whilst such an introduction would be welcome, the fact that a ball often crosses the goal-line for only a fraction of a second, as elucidated by Hawkins means that the use of technology would be a more foolproof solution to the issue. But sadly, such an introduction is unlikely to be forthcoming so long as FIFA and Blatter fail to change their inanely derisive stance towards science.

Fabregas should start ahead of Xavi

Spain bounced back from the shock of suffering defeat to Switzerland in their opening game by outclassing Honduras in a performance that was as eye-catching as it was efficient. That they won only by a two goal margin had much to do with the profligacy of their finishing, a deficiency which requires to be redressed if they are to have a chance of winning the World Cup. While David Villa, cutting in from the left wing was mostly ruthless and was denied a hat-trick only due to a misplaced penalty, his strike partner Fernando Torres, although showcasing good movement, was unusually mediocre with his finishing. No doubt, a lot of Spain’s football was dazzling; the neat triangles between Xavi Hernandez, Xabi Alonso and Sergio Busquets were as good as anything we have seen so far this World Cup, but there was a definite sense that the cutting edge required of a champion side was lacking.

This view is bound to face opposition, but I firmly believe that Cesc Fabregas must start for Spain ahead of Xavi, as he may well hold the answer to their shortcomings. Although Xavi comes into the World Cup finals on the back of a magnificent season in which his reputation has once again been tremendously augmented, Spain may need the myriad talents of Fabregas to succeed in South Africa. He may not yet be as ingenious a passer of the football as Xavi, but he gets into better positions in the penalty box and is indisputably a more accomplished finisher.

Fabregas’ goal scoring may not be the shining aspect of his game, but it has improved significantly enough over the course of the last few campaigns to be considered as a genuine talent. While Xavi has scored only 35 goals in 352 league appearances for Barcelona, Fabregas has notched up a remarkable tally of 15 goals in just 27 league outings for Arsenal last season. With Vicente Del Bosque intent on playing a system that incorporates two holding midfielders, it is imperative that the third central midfielder plays closer to the centre forward, something which Fabregas is more adept at, than Xavi. The Arsenal captain’s passing, which although not yet as skilled as Xavi, is not unduly inferior and I believe the intelligence of his movement in and around the box could prove crucial if Spain are to live up to their billing as favourites.

Chile's tactics thrill as expected

The outstanding Zonalmarking website’s prediction prior to the World Cup finals that Chile would be the most tactically exciting side was justified in style by the South American side in their 1-0 defeat of Honduras yesterday. Marcelo Bielsa, Chile’s Argentinean coach, likes to have a spare centre-back at all times and knowing that Honduras would begin the game with a lone centre forward, he tweaked his customary 3-3-1-3 to a more conventional 4-2-1-3 (or 4-2-3-1, depending on how the wide players are to be viewed), thereby pitting two central defenders against Honduras’ sole striker and giving license to the full backs to maraud forward.

Having gone into half time a goal down, Honduras moved Edgard Alvarez alongside Carlos Pavon up front, a change that saw Chile revert to the 3-3-1-3 that had served them exceptionally throughout qualifying. By replacing central midfielder Rodrigo Millar with central defender Gonzalo Jara and by allowing Mauricio Isla and Arturo Vidal to act as wing backs, Chile ensured that they possessed a spare centre back at all times. In the eyes of many this would be a purely reactive change, but by keeping his tactical options open, Biesla ensured that his side maintained the right defensive shape to balance their superb attacking options. (A more comprehensive tactical analysis of the game is provided here in the Zonalmarking website)

The tactical aspects apart, it must be said that it was great to watch a team play with wit, flair and imagination in a World Cup finals that has hitherto been largely colourless in attack. With the brilliant Matias Fernandez, deployed as a traditional playmaker, pulling the strings, and the front three of Jean Beausejour (to whom the first goal was credited), Jorge Valdivia and Alexis Sanchez pressing from the top, Chile were at times irrepressible. Sanchez’s pace and skill, in particular was a constant menace, with the Udinese forward creating numerous chances that would have seen Chile win by a more comfortable margin, if not for the profligacy of Beausejour and Valdivia in front of goal. The full backs Isla and Vidal, who were later deployed as wing backs must also be commended, for their verve and energy, which helped Chile successfully use the full width of the pitch.

With Switzerland having upset Spain by adopting the Jose Mourinho model of defensive design, Group H is now beautifully poised. The Swiss, who next fact Chile, will be expected to retain their dogged approach to the game, but Biesla’ tactics, eccentric to some, but mostly thoughtful, will hopefully continue to thrill.

Özil and co impressive in opener

Germany tore Australia to shreds last night in a performance brimming with astounding flair. Admittedly, they were hardly tested by a pedestrian and dreadfully defensive Socceroos outfit, but the movement of their front players was wonderful to behold. Mesut Özil, who was constantly drifting in an out of the hole behind Miroslav Klose, particularly impressed with his touch and movement throughout the game. His magnificent pass through to Thomas Müller en route to the first goal scored by Lukas Podolski was preceded by a turn of intelligence that belied his age and experience. Bayern Munich’s Müller, a year younger than Özil at 20, is also a wonderfully versatile footballer, blessed with pristine technique and crucially with an icy composure that he displayed with his finish for Germany’s third goal.

Having now won their opening game of the past six World Cup finals, Germany once again proved why they are a team that must never be written off. The side may be lacking in renowned stars, with Michael Ballack also having been ruled out of the tournament, but on the evidence of their showing last night, the present group of youngsters seem to possess the acuity to go with their undoubted flair, which makes them genuine title contenders.

Mexico's and Uruguay's Three Centre Backs

As has been well documented in recent times, the ploy of teams around the world in playing a lone striker has made tactical systems incorporating three centre backs all but redundant. The deficiencies of such a system were in ample evidence in Mexico’s 1-1 draw with South Africa in the opening game of the World Cup finals yesterday. Although it was believed prior to the kick-off that Rafael Marquez would start the game as a front sweeper, he was found dovetailing for most of the match alongside fellow centre-backs Ricardo Osorio and Francisco Javier Rodriguez, with Paul Aguilar and Carlos Salcido, plying as wingbacks.

The danger in such an arrangement is that by utilising three defenders to counter a single centre-forward, the opposition is certain to find space in other areas of the pitch. And in this case, South Africa found the extra space in the middle of midfield, from where Teko Modise played an excellent ball through to Siphiwe Tshabalala, who finished with aplomb, having cut in from the left wing. It was no doubt a fine through-ball followed by an outstanding finish, but it was clearly a result of the advantage derived by South Africa from Mexico’s decision to deploy a three member central defence against a team employing a sole centre forward.

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Uruguay who held France to a goalless draw yesterday also utilised a tactical system involving three centre backs against a team deploying a single centre forward, but with diverse effect. France’s 4-3-3, on paper should have caused Uruguay plentiful problems. But Frank Ribery’s tendency to drift in from the left wing and Sidney Govou’s ineptitude at this level coupled with Domenech’s decision to play him closer to Nicolas Anelka as opposed to using him on the right wing meant that none of Uruguay’s centre backs were rendered superfluous.

France also found their three players stationed in central midfield cancelled by Uruguay’s three in the middle of the pitch, which meant that they were forced to rely on their fullbacks for attacking width, a threat which was competently countered by the Uruguayan wing backs. This meant that even though France did have the odd chance, for most of the game, their tactics were skilfully nullified by Uruguay. It was certainly a commendable result for the South Americans, but the perils of their system, especially against sides using a single centre forward together with two wide players up front is bound to be exposed by teams possessing greater tactical acumen than France, even if not the flair.

World Cup 2010: A few first thoughts

1. Who are the seven players that should miss out on Fabio Capello’s final England squad? I’d leave out Stephen Warnock, Mathew Upson, Tom Huddlestone (unless Gareth Barry fails to prove his fitness), Scott Parker, Shaun Wright-Phillips, Adam Johnson and Emile Heskey.

2. Michael Essien’s troublesome knee has caused him to be ruled out of Ghana’s squad. Such a pity, for with Essien, I thought Ghana were near certainties to make it through to the knockout round.

3. Diego Maradona has picked only a single player capable of playing at full-back, Gabriel Heinze, in his Argentina squad. It’s simply unfathomable, how Javier Zanetti, who has been exceptional for Internazionale in their treble winning campaign, could have been overlooked.

4. Spain, in the eyes of most, are favourites for the World Cup. I would however pick Brazil as the team most likely to lift the trophy. The squad may lack some of the celebrated flair of the great Brazilian teams of days gone by, but Dunga’s set-up is as fluid as it is solid.

5. The Netherlands, as always possess a formidable attacking force and if Robben, Sneijder and van Persie are in their elements, they are capable of beating the best. But, devoid of a sufficiently strong backline, the Dutch are likely to be found wanting at the latter stages of the tournament.